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THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW, SCIENCE AND
MEDICINE: LEEWAYS OF CHOICE AND PATTERNS
OF DISCOURSE

GEORGE P. SMITH II*

I. SCIENTIFIC FREEDOMS v. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
On November 20 1973 Julius Stone presented the tenth annual Mooers
Lecture, entitled, "Knowledge, Survival, and The Duties of Science", at
American University in Washington, D.C.' The central question and theses
which he propounded then, could and indeed, should be raised anew today
- for they form the very core of the province and function of law, science
and medicine in our brave new world of today and tomorrow and they point
also to the leeways of choice and patterns of discourse that exist in grappling
with this central issue and possibly forging a consensus opinion for a
subsequent course of action. This, then, is the task of this article; namely, to
test, to probe anew and thereby critically analyse the modern significance of
Julius Stone's theses regarding the social responsibility of scientific inquiry.
Quoting from an address made by Sir Gustav Nossal in 1971, before the
Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science,
Stone admonished us to be aware of the "genetic revolution" where people
would be created in test tubes and molecular "monsters" would be released

*B.S., J.D., Indiana University; LL.M. Columbia University. Professor of Law, The Catholic University of
America, Washington, D.C. Visiting Professor of Law, Visiting Fellow, Centre for Law and Technology,
Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales (July, August 1987). Professor Smith was the Fulbright
Visiting Professor of Law and Medical Jurisprudence at the University of New South Wales in 1984.
The author acknowledges the personal kindnesses and friendship of Professor Ivan A. Shearer, Dean
Emeritus of the Law Faculty and Dr George G. Winterton, Chairman of the Faculty, for their invaluable
assistance during his recent stay at the University of New South Wales.
Parts of this article derive from the Julius and Reca Stone Lecture presented August 20 1987, at the
University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia.
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into the atmosphere. 2 He proceeded to caution that "the liberty to extend
knowledge is not absolute", but must be limited when it is in conflict with
other values. 3 He posited the central question of his inquiry as being a study
of the extent to which scientists
have a moral duty to consider, along with others of competent knowledge, whether a line
of inquiry should be desisted from as soon as it becomes clear that it is likely to bring
about a mankind endangering situation, which no one has any foreseeable capacity to
handle. 4

Although debatable whether it is totally impossible to reverse the process
of discovery, Stone suggested that particular scientists might well have a
moral duty "not to contribute by his work to the certainty or speed of its
arrival." 5 He acknowledged that the essential role of the scientist is to
advance knowledge and that compromises should not be freely undertaken
that limit his inherent or fundamental freedom to so act and further, "that
whether knowledge is put to good or evil use is a matter for society generally,
' 6
and not for scientists.
From this, Stone shaped his thesis accordingly to state that: "scientists
have a duty to exercise self-restraint in pressing further those scientific
activities which manifest" a likelihood that they will result in
"limit-situations" or, in other words, "dangers of cataclysmic physical or
psychological proportions for mankind as a whole"; and specifically where
the particular scientist in question is actually "aware of this likelihood as a
proximate outcome" of his own work. 7 He stressed the point that the
scientific duty of restraint should only be imposed when the scientist is
"clearly able to foresee that the particular line of work is leading to a kind and
8
scale of dangers" that would constitute a "limit-situation".
Thus, Stone delimits the scope of scientific inquiry to a very narrow, but
admittedly, crucial range. 9 He observed that his essential inquiry is "not
whether scientists should cease all activity which might lead to any dangers,
much less that they should always be able to foresee all consequences."' 10
Rather, it is tied to "whether they should not desist from activities likely to
lead to dangers cataclysmic for mankind, and against which no protection
seems possible,
from the moment at which they can already foresee these
1
dangers."'
Stone noted with pride that the substance of his thesis had been adopted
and codified "as a basic constitutional principle" not only by "many groups

2 Id., 232.
3 Id., 235.
4 Id., 234.
5 Id., 236, 237.
6 Id., 240.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Id.,
241.
10 Id.,
246.
11 Ibid.
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of scientists" in Britain but2 one in Sydney as well under the name, "Social
Responsibility in Science".1
He admitted that the criteria which he submitted for determining restraints
on scientific inquiry lacked "precision"; but he explained that, "the
indeterminacies leaned in favour of the traditional scientific freedom of
investigation" and that "no duty of restraint" arose unless the scientist was
able to foresee, for himself, the magnitude of the dangers of his research. He
contended further that even though elements of indeterminacy were present
within the criteria which he postulated, they "give guidance to all concerned"

in that they not only indicate "the relevant orders of magnitude and
imminence but also the nature of the substantive values threatened."1 3 More
specifically, Stone was concerned with two orders of such values: one that
embraces the limits of physical integrity and the sanctity of human life
together with mankind's survival in general and the second one concerned as
such with the dangers arising from "scientific advances to human
individuality, in the sense of the autonomy of the human will and sensibilities
presupposed by our notions of freedom."14
Stone expressed his grave reservation about the feasibility of in vitro
fertilisation as well as genetic surgery and engineering.' 5 Although he
recognised barren marriages could be resolved by the new non-coital

techniques for reproduction and further, that genetic engineering could
alleviate genetic-born disease and disability, he "would not admit that relief

afforded for such cases (admirable in itself though it might be) could even
begin to tip the scales against the formidable dangers to a liberty-based
society to which test-tube birth or any analogue of this would open the
way."' 6

12
13
14
15
16

Id., 249.
Id., 259.
Ibid.
Id., 258.
Ibid. See generally, 1. Stone, "When Politics is Harder than Physics: Sketch of a Code for Science" in
D. Olroyd (ed.), Science and Ethics (1982) 93-117. But see, G.P. Smith, "Intimations of Life:
Extracorporeality and The Law" (1986) 21 Gonzaga L Rev 395; G.P. Smith, "Procreational
Autonomy v. State Intervention: Opportunity or Crisis for a Brave New World?" (1986) 2 Notre
Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Policy 635; G.P. Smith, "Australia's Frozen 'Orphan' Embryos: A Medical,
Legal and Ethical Dilemma" (1985) 24 JFam L 27; G.P. Smith & R. lraola, "Sexuality, Privacy and
The New Biology" (1984) 67 Marq L Rev 263. A recent New South Wales Law Reform
Commission Discussion Paper, "In Vitro Fertilization", found "no persuasive reason to restrict or
prohibit total research IVF embryos - provided the research was completed within a two week
period after the embryo was formed". The Law Reform Commission suggested the creation of a
state advisory committee to assist physicians and scientists to grapple with the vexatious ethical
questions inherent within the area and stressed the need for self-regulation within the medical
community. Mr Russell Scott, the Deputy Chairman of the Law Reform Commission, summed up
the medico-legal-scientific realities of the issues here by concluding, "[v] ery strict legislation is not
going to have any effect on IVF or which way research goes because it is happening on a global
basis". O'Neill, "Embyro IVF Research is Favoured" Sydney Morning Herald, July 30 1987. See
New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Artificial Conception, Discussion Paper 2, In Vitro
Fertilization (July 1987). See generally, R. Scott, The Body as Property (1981).
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1. Human Rights andthe New Technology
Among the sophisticated countries such as Australia, Europe and America,
the pervasive attitude has been - until quite recently - quite supportive of

scientific inquiry and discovery; for it was believed that this action was not
only of overwhelming benefit to society, but an essential attribute of human
achievement and progress in the brave new world. 17 Subsequent agonising
reflections on the horrors of World War 1 and World War 11 and the all too
frequent limited conflicts since 1945, together sometimes with overly
emotional concerns regarding the full potential for nuclear, bacteriological
and chemical warfare and its very real potential for annihilating mankind,
have witnessed a new and increasingly pessimistic temperament concerning
scientific advancement. Indeed, it has been recognised that "not all science is
good for humanity." 1 8
The importance of human rights and their need to be recognised in the era
of the "New Biology" was underscored by initial efforts at the United
Nations in the 1960s.1 9 But before that activity, the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights guarantees of "human dignity" written in
Articles 1, 5, 6 and 29(1)20 established eloquent reminders of the need for
the advances of biotechnology and genetic engineering to be tied to a basic
understanding of and respect for fundamental human rights. 21 Indeed, what

is needed now is a new human rights debate among not only the legal
community - but with scientists and technologists; a debate that would
consider anew the extent to which both the traditional and the redefined
rights of humanity are challenged or, as the case may be, complemented by
the plethora of medical, legal, scientific and technological considerations of
the brave new world that is already here. As Mr Justice Kirby has succinctly
summarised the issue:
[ilf lawyers are to continue to play a relevant part in the human rights debate of the
future, they must become more aware of scientific and technological advances.

17
18

M.D. Kirby, "Human Rights - The Challenge of the New Technology" (1986) 60 ALJ 170.
Id, 171.

19

Id, 179. See generally, R. Lillich, F. Newman International Human Rights: Problems ofLawand Policy

20
21

(1979).
G.A. Res. 217A (11), U.N. Doc A/810, 71 (1948).
Note 17 supra, 179. Mr Justice Kirby has cautioned that the increasing knowledge of human fertility
and its varied and mechanical applications draw new attention to other human rights guarantees:
"[clan art. 16(1) of the Universal Declaration, with its guarantee that men and women of full age
have a right to marry and 'to found a family' provide support for a claim to in vitro fertilisation,
embryo transplantation, artificial insemination, surrogate parenting and womb leasing,
transplantation and the like? Is the guarantee of special care and assistance for motherhood and
childhood in art. 25(2) relevant to the new procedures available to overcome infertility? Is the
guarantee of adequate health and medical care in art. 25(1) the basis for a claim of access without
limitation to these expensive new techniques?" See generally, G.P. Smith, "The Razor's Edge of
Human Bonding: Artificial Fathers and Surrogate Mothers" (1982) 5 West New Eng L Rev 639;
G.P. Smith, "The Perils and Peregrinations of Surrogate Mothers" (1982) 1 IntlJMed& Law 325;
G.P. Smith, "Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and The Law" (1968) 67 Mich L
Rev 127.
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lack understanding of the questions to be asked, let
Otherwise, they will increasingly
22
alone answers to be given.

Law has, all too often been found - in the words of Mr Justice Windeyer
- to be "marching with medicine but in the rear and limping a little." 23 Law,
science and medicine must become full and not limited partners and march in
unison as they approach the task of assuring the primary goal of society both

today and tomorrow that all citizens have an equal opportunity to achieve
have their
their maximum potential within the economic marketplace,
24
physical suffering minimised and spiritual tranquility assured.
II.

SOCIOBIOLOGY'S CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY

A new and exciting debate is beginning to focus renewed scientific interest

and momentum in structuring a discipline, the study and investigation of
which portends vast increases in attaining a new level of understanding of our
genetic response mechanisms heretofore unrealised. It also presents a perfect
example of the much needed full partnership of law, science and medicine to
which I have just referred.
The sociobiology debate has been described "as the continuance of the

historic conflict created in the social sciences and humanities by the
mechanistic examination of human nature through the instruments of

conventionial biology. ' 2 5 Strictly as a discipline, rather than a theory,
sociobiology is defined classically as, "It] he systematic study of the biological
basis of all social behavior" 26 with human sociobiology being but one aspect
of the whole study of the biological basis of social behavior. 27 Stated
otherwise, sociobiology is but the study of "the evolutionary roots of social
behavior." 2 8 Evolutionary sociobiology's goal should be not only to

reconstruct the history of primates and identify their course of adaption over
29
time, but to monitor the genetic basis of current models of social behavior.

22

23
24

25
26
27
28
29

Note 17 supra, 181. In the Inaugural Glaxo Medical Association Lecture, "The Future of Medicine
- From a Medico Legal Viewpoint", which Mr Justice Kirby delivered before the Centennial
Meeting of the New Zealand Medical Association in Auckland, New Zealand, May 21 1987, he
urged a recognition that since the complex moral and ethical questions presented by the challenges
of law, science and medicine "involve the opinions of ordinary people in the community", they
"are better dealt with frankly and openly by processes of community debate and law reform", than
in "courtrooms or hospital ethics committees". Id., 22.
Mount Isa Mines Ltd v. Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 283, 395.
See generally, Z. Cowen, Reflections on Medicine, Bid-Technology and the Law (1986). See also, H.
Barnett, "Biotechnology - Can the Law Cope?" (1986) 15 Anglo-Am L Rev 149; M.H. Shapiro,
"Introduction to the Issue: Some Dilemmas of Biotechnological Research" (1978) 51 So CalifL Rev
1987.
E. Wilson, Foreword, in A. Caplan (ed.), The Sociobiology Debate: Readings on Ethical and Scientific
Issues (1978) xi.
E. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975) 595.
Ibid.
S.A. Peterson, "Sociobiology and Ideas Become Real: Case Study and Assessment" (1981) 4 J
Social& BiolStruct 125.
Note 26 supra, 575.
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As Edward 0. Wilson, the modern-day progenitor of Sociobiology has stated:
[c]
ontemporary general sociobiology might at best explain a tiny fraction of human social
behavior in a novel manner. Its full applicability will be settled only by a great deal more
imaginative research by both evolutionary biologists and social scientists. In this sense the
true creative debate has just begun."'

Darwin's basic evolutionary theory could be stated simply as being that, all
living organisms are related by common inheritance. 31 In 1865 Francis
Galton - relying extensively on this theory - determined that his task was

to encourage the use of positive eugenics or, the application of the science of
genetics to man in order to improve the species in a biological sense and
thereby breed the better, stronger elements of the populace and, accordingly,
discourage the breeding of the lower socio-economic classes. 32 The eugenic
movement that was initiated by Galton and resulted in the passage of eugenic
sterilisation laws in most States of the United States, 33 ended - essentially significant force in
in 1932.3 4 Environment was determined to be a more
35
shaping personal qualities than the transmissible genes.
Gene sovereignty or biological determinism 36 remains under constant
challenge by environmentalists who assert that - as to sociobiology - there

is no genetic variation in the transmission of culture. "Culture" noted
Dobzhansky, "is not inherited through genes, it is acquired by learning from
"3 7 Boulding's theory of "Ecodynamics" builds up a
other human beings ....
non-biological process that posits that each generation of human beings
rather than by the
learns more from the previous generation culturally
38
inheritance of biologically pre-determined genes.
The assertions made by sociobiologists that sociobiology allows for an
opportunity to explicate heretofore inexplicable behavioral phenomena
within a restructured framework of contemporary Darwinian evolutionary
theory, has rekindled a strong biological interest in the sociobiology
discipline. 39 Although there has been substantial criticism about what is
perceived as the illegitimate use of biological analogy in analysing social

30

E. Wilson in A. Caplan (ed.), The Sociobiology Debate, note 25 supra, xiii, xiv.

31

G. Hardin, Nature andMans Fate (1959) 4.

32

ld, 214, 215. See also Ch. 13. See D. Kevles, "Annals of Eugenics" The New Yorker Mag., Oct. 8
1984, 51; Oct. 15 1984, 52; Oct. 22 1984, 92; Oct. 29 1984, 51.
G.P. Smith, Genetics, Ethics andthe Law (1981) 20, 21, 35; G.P. Smith, "Genetics, Eugenics and the
Family: Exploring the Ying and the Yang" (1984) 8 U Tas L Rev 4.
Note 31 supra, 225. See also, C. Blacker, Eugenics: Galton andAfter (1952).
Note 31 supra, 224. See G.P. Smith, "Uncertainties on the Spiral Staircase: Metaethics and The
New Biology" (1978) 41 Pharos MedJ 10.
S.J. Gould, "Biological Potential vs. Biological Determinism" in A. Caplan (ed.), The Sociobiology
Debate note 25 supra.
T. Dobzhansky, "Anthropology and the Natural Sciences - The Problem of Human Evolution"
(1963) 4 Current Anthropology 138, 146.
K. Boulding, Ecodynamics: A New Theory of Social Evolution (1978). Other attacks on Darwin's
principle of organic evolution have been made. See e.g., S. Stanley, The New Evolutionary Timetable
Ch. 4 (1981).
Caplan, Introduction, in A. Caplan (ed.), The Sociobiology Debate, note 25 supra, 5.

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
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systems, 40 and the inherent weakness of the non-verifiable assertion of the
sociobiologists that human social structures exist because of a superior
adaptive value, 41 the efficacy and relevance of the theory of sociobiology for
the study of both human behavior and human nature is of unique significance
because of the fact that it "stands as an instance of a rarely observed
intellectual phenomenon:
the attempt to produce and legitimize a new
42
scientific discipline."
Evolution may be regarded as "a competition for survival among
genes", 43 with the survival depending in large part upon regeneration of the
species. 44 This, in turn, will be tied to a standard of evolutionary behavior
which will mandate - all things being equal - a form of altruistic conduct
45

promotive of this regeneration.

The evolutionary theories of sociobiologists show that beings who considered only their
own interests would leave fewer descendants than beings who also considered the
interests of their kin. So there is a good reason to believe that we do not all act solely in
our own interests. Genes promoting strictly selfish behavior in individual animals would
46
be less likely to survive than genes which do not.

Relying upon the principle of reciprocity, sociobiologists suggest two forms
of altruism are at work in the process of natural selection and propagation of
the gene: kin altruism and reciprocal altruism. 47 Both forms are, in an
ultimate sense, promotive of the "Selfish Gene's" best interest of survival
and propagation. 48
Kin altruism is a genetically based tendency to assist one's relatives and
should extend beyond an immediate family to include cousins, as well as
nieces and nephews. 49 In the animal kingdom, kin altruism as a theory
merely posits that animals may be expected to act as if they are aware of
genetic relationships - with no direct knowledge of the degree of
relationship being acknowledged. 50 While reciprocal altruism should be
regarded ideally as the source of attitudes of moral approval and disapproval,
as well as ideas of fairness, gratitude, retribution and cheating, it appears not
to be altruism at all, but merely "enlightened self-interest. ' 1 "Concern for
one's own interests, plus the knowledge that exchanges of assistance are
likely to be in the long term interests of both partners, is all that is needed. ' 52
40

K. Boulding, "Sociobiology or Biosociology?" (1978) Society 28. See also, P. Singer, The Expanding
Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology (1981) 7, 28; Frankel, Sociobiology and its Critics, Commentary (1979)

39.
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People, "Sociobiology - Another Biological
Determinism", in A. Caplan (ed.), The Sociobiology Debate,note 25 supra, 280, 287.
A. Caplan, Introduction in A Caplan (ed.), The Sociobiology Debate,note 25 supra, 3.
Singer, note 40 supra, 11.
Id., 12.
Ibid.
Id., 128.
Id., 11.
J. Beckstrom, Sociobiology and the Law (1985) 13.
Singer, note 40 supra, 14.
Ibid.
Id., 42.
Ibid.
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The effect of biological evolution upon the development of law has been

both studied and evaluated for quite some time. 53 Indeed, it has been
suggested that the legal "roots" of sociobiology are to be found in the
writings of Maine, Corbin, Wigmore and Holmes 54 - and, of course one
must add Stone and Pound. The very theory of legal evolution was structured
by Holmes when he observed that,
[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more
to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
55
governed.

Continuing further, he stated that,
the law is always approaching, and never reaching, consistency. It is forever adopting new
principles from life at one end, and it always retains old ones56from history at the other ...
It
will become entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow.

Modernly, efforts are being undertaken to postulate a theory of
sociobiology for aid-giving actions that have legal consequences 57 and more
60
59
especially intestate wealth transfers, 58 general property rights, privacy,
and the doctrine of nuisance. 6 1 Indeed, although biological theory may offer
no unquestioned answers of why certain legal outcomes result from genetic
alignments, important partial explanations may be proferred. 62 Nay sayers do
exist, however, 3and are quick to note that evolution has had little effect on
6
the bulk of law.
1.

Human Application
Considered as a theory, the core of sociobiology - applied to humans - is
that simply: we have been programmed by evolutionary biology to be
predisposed - either at a conscious or unconscious level of awareness - to

aid other human beings in such a manner "that the genes or genetic material
we each carry are likely to be ultimately benefited in the sense of being

53
54
55
56
57
58

59

E.D. Elliott, "The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence" (1985) 85 Colum L Rev 38.
Id., 71.
0. Holmes, The Common Law (1963) (M. Howe, ed.) 5.
Id, 32. See 0. Holmes, "Law in Science and Science in Law" (1899) 12 I-farv L Rev 443.
J. Beckstrom, "Behavioural Research in Aid-Giving That Can Assist Lawmakers While Testing
Scientific Theory" (1985) 1 J ContemplHealthL& Poly 25.
J. Beckstrom, "Sociobiology and Intestate Wealth Transfers" (1981) 76 Nw UL Rev 216.
W.H. Rodgers, "Bringing People Back: Toward A Comprehensive Theory of Taking in Natural
Resources Law" (1982) 10 Ecology L Q 205. Professor Rodgers attempts to use sociobiology as a
foundation for development of a prescriptive theory of law based on positive rights - this as a
counterpoise to the more traditional reliance upon economic vectors of force; W.H. Rodgers,

"Building Theories of Judicial Review in Natural Resources Law" (1982) 53 U Colo L Rev 213,
60
61
62
63

214-215.
J. Hirshleifer, "Privacy: Its Origins, Function and Future" (1980) 9 JLegalStud 649.
Rodgers, "Bringing People Back" note 59 supra, 219.
Id., 221.
See e.g., R.A. Epstein, "A Taste for Privacy? Evolution and the Emergence of a Naturalistic Ethic"
(1980) 9 JLegalStud665, 670.
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proliferated through reproduction. ' 64 This theory, followed to a reasonable
level of application, may be found to project varying (and sometimes
startling) implications pertinent to one's predisposition to aid either a direct
offspring, a parent, niece or even a stranger. 65 Interacting with environment
and culture, these predispositions vary in intensity and make the task of the
behavioral scientist a truly formidable one as he seeks to predict the levels of
co-operative behavior or, in other words, the "nuance66 of aid-giving", likely
to happen within different environments and cultures.
The law often finds it necessary to engage in predictions or speculations
which, in actuality, involve aid-giving inclinations. The average, ordinary,
reasonable person's reactions to a given situation are tested repeatedly in
order to reach a standard of fairness for judicial decision-making or legislative
design. 67 The enhanced opportunities for more accurate prediction or
speculation are realised when the behavioral scientists are allowed to join
forces with legal decision-makers in an attempt to determine how the
somewhat mythical average person with a defined set of characteristics is
most likely to follow
a particular behavioral pattern when an issue of
68
aid-giving is present.
Even those judges or legislators who are jealous of their decision making prerogatives and
suspicious of 'mechanical' approaches based upon scientific information should be
receptive to advice from scientists regarding such questions.6 9

Marked differences of opinion abound within the discipline of sociobiology
thus maintaining its essential underpinning in a state of flux. 70 Basing its
efficacy in genetics and evolutionary learning, sociobiology is, indeed,
conceptually difficult. 71 Obviously, until the theory of sociobiology becomes
more settled and empirically verifiable, it cannot be used as a basis for law
making. But "the potential for immediate mutually beneficial joint research
projects between lawyers and scientists appears to exist; ...
it is not too early
for lawyers and sociobiologists to become more aware of each other.'7 2
2. Expectations
If one of the most important ideals or, for that matter, tasks for a
contemporary society is to devise a system of laws wherein the laws of nature
are complemented by man-made laws, then sociobiology holds the hope and
64

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Note 48 supra, 1. The sociobiologist - being a pragmatic biologist who has been trained in both
psychology and evolutionary history - posits that the emotional control centres in the
hypothalamus and limbic system of the brain both constrain and shape self-knowledge; and
furthermore that these two centres flood the consciousness with all the emotions, including love,
fear and hate. E. Wilson, note 26 supra, 3.
Id., 2.
Ibid.
Note 64 supra, 3.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Id.,
4.
Ibid.
Id., 5.
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the promise of such a normative coalescence. Even though science is not
capable of solving normative problems, it can serve a valuable role in
assisting in the evaluation of the means as well as the consequences of
reaching various goals. Thus, together with individual value judgments, these
analyses can contribute directly to a final selection of goals. Surely, scientific
insights into human nature are equally important to the task of formulating
ethical and legal systems. Since biological evolution has, by
pre-determination, imposed broad behavioral constraints on individual
development, cultural evolution must endeavour to chart a course between
these borders.73 Perhaps the time has come when serious consideration
should be given to removing ethics temporarily from the philosophers and
74
giving them to the scientists where they in turn may be "biologised".
Indeed, sociobiology should be recognised as affording a basis for a new and
enhanced understanding of ethics; for it enables a fresh comprehension of
context,
ethics as "a mode of human reasoning which develops in a' group
75
building on more limited biologically based forms of altruism.
Since the extent of biology's gift to future law-making efforts is clouded,
perhaps it is better to test or evaluate the absorptive capacities of law. 76 The
extent to which law receives or at least listens to what sociobiology is
revealing, depends in large part upon the willingness of lawmakers, judges,
and legal scholars to welcome scientific knowledge as a bridge to present
levels of ignorance and professional rigidity. 77 By endeavouring to explain
norm-forming processes, sociobiology and other behavioral sciences may
have an important contribution to make in forming broad legal policies 78 and
more specifically, by arranging interactions in order79thereby to facilitate
dispute resolution and promoting norm-forming action.
III.

THE NEW BIOLOGY IN AMERICA

Today, scientific work is less a basic expression of the "ancient aristocratic
ethos of the love of knowledge" than a mere job to be done - by
80
entrepreneurs, employees, or others who have independent funding.
73
74

75

76
77
78
79
80

B.D. Davis, "A Middle Course Between Irrelevance And Scientism", in A. Caplan (ed.), The
Sociobiology Debate, note 25 supra, 315, 316.
E. Wilson, note 26 supra, 562. See J.M.Gustafson, "Sociobiology: A Secular Theology" (1979) 9(1)
Hastings Center Rpt 44. See generally, G.P. Smith, "Intrusions of a Parvenu: Science, Religion and
the New Biology" (1982) 3 Pace L Rev 63.
P. Singer, note 40 supra, 149. Accordingly, the sociobiological perceptive analysis of ethics should be
regarded as being on the same level as either anthropological or sociological accounts of ethics; (81
and Ch. 3.) See generally, M. Rosen, "Classical Sociology and The Law" (1985) 50x J Leg Studies
61. A. Hyde, "The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law" [19831 Wis L Rev 379.
R.D. Schwartz, "On the Prospects of Using Sociobiology in Shaping the Law: A Cautionary Note"
(1982) 5 JSocialBiol& Struct 325.
Id., 326.
Id., 332.
Ibid.
Compton, "Science, Anti-Science and Human Values" (1980) 1 Amicus 33. See generally, G.P.
Smith, Genetics, Ethics and the Law (1981).
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Genentech, a San Francisco based biotechnology company, recently issued
shares on the over-the-counter market. Among its products is a hormone
capable of stimulating human growth, mass produced human insulin which
would allow a substantial reduction in cost of the treatment of diabetes, and
interferon which may prove to be the long awaited 'miracle' drug to combat
cancer. The price of Genentech stock increased dramatically during the first
even suggested that Genentech may well be
day of trading, and some brokers
81
the next Polaroid or Xerox.
It has been asserted that patenting new forms of life, as sanctioned by the
United States Supreme Court, 82 will be guided by short term profit motives
rather than sound philosophical principles. 8a However, scientific knowledge
is not -

in and of itself -

an absolute end. The thrust and purpose of

patenting new life forms is basically technological and is essentially political.
its costs and its
Because the etiology of new life forms is political, both
84
benefits are, of necessity, of public interest and concern.
Pure scientific inquiry does not produce an economic exploitation of
nature; only man's use of the truths of scientific inquiry does. With the
methodological style of nature, science seeks to demonstrate causal relations
among events. Thus, the laws of science state that whenever X occurs or
varies in a particular way, Y will similarly occur or vary in a particular way.
This phenomenon has been aptly termed "a formula for action". Its practical
application awaits only an individual's decision that it might be economically
advantageous to try to mobilise X's to produce Y's.85 Science promises truth,
not peace of mind. 86 Yet, liberty to extend knowledge is never to be regarded
as absolute - but rather,87as has been seen, undergoes limitation when it
conflicts with other values.
I now proceed to focus the spirit of inquiry and analysis on the additional
parameters of the scientific imperative to explore truth; with the scope of this
inquiry being shaped in large part by the United States patent laws and
administrative interpretations and, more specifically, by the United States
Supreme Court in its momentous holding allowing new forms of life created
in a laboratory to be patented. The ultimate purpose of this investigation is to

81

82
83
84
85
86
87

"Investors Dream of Genes" Time Mag, Oct. 20 1980, 72. The potential profits derived from
manipulating the genetic code - be it either to create new forms of life sufficient to clean up toxic
chemical wastes or to produce anti-cancer agents on grand scale - spurred President Derek Bok of
Harvard University to suggest that his University start its own genetic engineering firm. Strong
faculty opposition, however, forced him to give up these plans. "A Firm No" Time Mag., Dec. 1
1980, 59. See generally, I. Cooper, Biotechnology and the Law (1987).
Diamond v. Chakrabarty 447 US 303 (1980).
G.J. Annas, "Life Forms: The Law and the Profits" (1978) 8(5) Hastings Center Rpt 21, 22. See
also, Stich, "The Rewards and Risks of Studying Genes" (1986) 16(2) Hastings Center Rpt 39.
Note 80 supra, 37.
Ibid.
See Hilts, "'Rules' Drawn for Marketing Gene Research" Wash Post March 28 1982, Al, col. 3;
Will, "The Spiral of Patents Pending" Wash Post June22 1980, B7, col. 6.
Note 1 supra.
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refute the arrogance of power theory expressed as being implicit in the
current studies of the vast potential for the positive achievement of good
through harnessing the "New Biology". Thus, I intend to demonstrate that
what has been dismissed as but a magnificent obsession for power, profits
and immortality has - in truth - a far more instrinsic potential for good and
reward for the scientific community and the greater world community.
Improvement of man's genetic endowment by striving for positive
propagation of those with a superior genetic make-up or, conversely,
delimitation of those with negative genetic inheritance has always been a
primary concern in the field of genetics.88 If the quality of life in some way
may be improved or advanced by use of law as it relates to genetics, then such
must be undertaken. No longer does the Dostoevskian quest to give life
meaning through suffering become an inescapable given. By and through
new scientific advances in the field of genetics and successes with in vitro
fertilisation, the real potential exists to prevent, in large measure, much
human suffering before it manifests itself in or through life.
1. AlteringHuman Evolution
Today, man is in a position not only to alter the social and environmental
conditions of the universe, but also to change his very essence. 89 The
mythology of the Minotaur and the Centaur, half man and half animal, may
well become the reality of the twenty-first century. Indeed, modern medicine
is presently not only attempting to create man-animal combinations, but also
man-machine combinations or cyborgs. 90 Plastic arteries, artificial hearts,
electrically controlled artificial limbs, and pacemakers highlight the
achievements of modern science to replace diseased or worn out parts of the
human body. 9 1
Efforts to construct or engineer biologically functional bacterial plasmids in
vitro exemplify the relatively new technology of recombinant DNA. 92
Regarded as the most significant step in the field of genetics since 1953,
research in this technology will facilitate identification of every one of the 100
000 genes in the human cell. Armed with this information, efforts could be
directed toward replacing defective genes with healthy ones. Thus, the hope
is that by making such replacements, genetic diseases such as haemophilia

88
89
90
91
92

See, Genetics, Ethics and the Law, note 33 supra, 1. See also, "Genetics, Eugenics and Family
Planning", note 33 supra, 4.
J. Fletcher, The Ethics of Genetic Control (1979) 5. See G.P. Smith, "Manipulating the Genetic Code:
Jurisprudential Conundrums" (1976) 64 Ga L Rev 697. See generally, "The Razor's Edge of
Human Bonding" note 21 supra 639.
C. Rivers, "Genetic Engineering Portends a Grave New World", (April 8 1972) 55 Sat Rev 23. See
generally, V. Goodfield, Playing God (1977); G.P. Smith, "Intimations of Immortality: Clones,
Cryons and The Law" (1983) 6 UNSWLJ 119.
See generally, A. Toynbee, Surviving the Future (1971) and The Prospects of Western Civilization
(1949).
DNA is the basic genetic material that transmits inherited characteristics.
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and sickle-cell anemia could be conquered. 93 Indeed, the plenitude of new
products of nature that could substantially improve the human condition is
staggering to the imagination.
The National Institute of Health has taken a conservative view of the limits
of safety review required by those institutions receiving Federal grant monies
to experiment in DNA. In 1980, two hundred representatives from the
scientific community called upon NIH to loosen the restriction on
gene-splitting experiments conducted in the United States. The scientists
expressed the growing agreement that DNA research carries with it fewer
94
risks than had once been thought.
The central question which arises in relation to the current scientific
advances, is whether genetic engineering should be promoted and
encouraged as a basic recognition of the freedom of scientific inquiry and
right of privacy. Significant potential dangers are present in conjunction with
the almost limitless opportunity for scientific advancement within the
technology of recombinant DNA, commonly referred to as genetic
engineering. The fear that the proverbial 'mad scientist', working
independently or with an enemy foreign power, could isolate and then
proceed to duplicate a cancer organism and place it - possibly - in public
water supplies is not easily dismissed. Acts of thoughtless negligence in a
laboratory could result in the 'escape' of a deadly microbe which in turn could
give rise to a 'parade of horribles'. Chance occurrences are always inherent in
any scientific intervention. 95 When the chance of harmful accident is
calculated, the primary consideration is whether the merit of the intervention
96
justifies beginning or continuing the experiment.
Genetic engineering, viewed as an instrument to revolutionise, limits the
effect of natural selection and replaces it with programmed decision making.
Programmed decision making - in turn - serves to facilitate rational
thinking rather than impede it. Is it shameful to acknowledge that man has
the capability to be in control of himself'? The lack of control over the years
has spawned a type of 'evolutionary wisdom' which, in turn, resulted in the
bubonic plague, smallpox, yellow fever, typhoid, diabetes and cancer. Today,
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Clark, Begley & Hager, "The Miracle of Spliced Genes" Newsweek March 17 1980, 62. See
generally R.F. Baker & W.G. Clough, "The Technological Uses and Methodology of Recombinant
DNA" (1978) 51 So Cahif L Rev 1009; Berger, "Government Regulation of the Pursuit of
Knowledge: The Recombinant DNA Controversy" (1978) 3 Sup Ct L Rev 83; J.P. Swazey, J.R.
Sorenson & C.B. Wong, "Risks and Benefits, Rights and Responsibilities: A History of the
Recombinant DNA Research Controversy" (1978) 51 So CalifjL Rev 1019.
"Scientists Want Limit Dropped on Gene Splitting Experiments" Wash Post November 26 1980,
C3, col. 5. But see, Fields, "Bizarre Circumstances Surround Chance Cloning of Banner Virus"
Chronicle of Higher Education August 25 1980 1, col. I (in violation of Federal guidelines that bar
genetic copying, a researcher at the University of California at San Diego cloned a virus); I.R.
Holtzman, "Patenting Certain Forms of Life: A Moral Justification" (1979) 9(3) Hastings Center
Rpt 9.
R. Neville, "Philosophic Perspective on Freedom of lnquiry" (1978) 51 So CalijfLRev 1115, 1121.
C. Cohen, "Restriction of Research with Recombinant DNA: The Dangers of Inquiry and The
Burden of Proof" (1978) 51 So CalifL Rev 1081, 1082, 1099.
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the quest for maximum efficient utilisation of biological and medical
knowledge represents one of the tenets of the so-called 'evolutionary
wisdom' .9

A number of Post-Darwinians in the scientific community assert that there
is no wisdom in evolution, only chance occurrence. Few, if any, would be
willing to accept unconditionally all that nature bestows, particularly disease.

Consequently, science finds itself in the position of trying to both influence
and, in many cases, control the process of evolution. Some would go so far as
to suggest that dangerous knowledge is never half as dangerous as dangerous
ignorance. 98
The sanctity of creation and the fundamental right of privacy in procreation
- an acknowledged basic or fundamental freedom - may be altered by
compelling state interests. 99 Is there a more compelling state interest than the
desire to stop a 'chromosomal lottery' which saddles the economy each year
with four million Americans born with diabetes or fifty thousand born with
discernible genetic diseases? 100 State interests in minimising human suffering
and maximising the social good should be properly validated. 101
Opponents of unrestricted genetic research specifically attack its
proponents as being both scientifically and socially irresponsible and the
ultimate promoters of a serious environmental disaster. 0 2 They suggest that
nature has developed strong barriers against genetic interchanges between
species and that extreme caution ought to be used during experimentation in
this area.' 0 3 Others argue that mankind's genetic inheritance is its greatest
and most indispensable treasure which must be protected and guaranteed at
any cost. These opponents submit that the evolutionary wisdom of the ages
must not be irreversibly threatened or abridged in order to satisfy the
ambition and professional curiosity of some members of the scientific
community.
Autonomy, self-determination, and a basic sense of freedom must be
tempered by logic, objectivity and a disinterested search for knowledge, a

97 J. Fletcher, "Ethics and Recombinant DNA Research" (1978) 51 So CalifL Rev 1131, 1139.
Fletcher observes that there is nothing fundamentally unnatural or intrinsically wrong, or hazardous
for the species, in the ambition that drives man to develop the technology to understand himself. It
would in fact seem more offensive to fail to use and develop man's natural curiosity and talent for
asking questions or worse to try to suppress it. Fletcher quotes from Lewis Thomas,"Ithis is the
greater danger of our species, to try to pretend that we are another kind of animal ... and that the
human mind can rise above its ignorance by simply asserting that there are things it has no need to
know." L. Thomas, "Notes of a Biology Watcher: The Hazards of Science" (1977) 296 NEngiJMed
324, 328.
98 See Toulmin, "Science and Ethics: Can They Be Reconnected" (1981) 73 UChiMag 2.
99 See Roe v. Wade 410 US 113 (1973). See "Procreational Autonomy v. State Intervention" and
"Sexuality, Privacy and The New Biology" note 16 supra.
100 See J.D. Roslansky, Genetics and the Future of Man (1966) 46.
101 See Genetics, Ethics and the Law note 33 supra, 2.
102 See generally, R. Howard, J. Rifkin, Who Should Play God? (1977); Hilts, "Genetic Scientist is
Punished for Test Violations" Wash Post March 23 1981, A 1, col. 1.
103 R.L. Sinsheimer, "Recombinant DNA - On our Own" (1976) 26 BioScience 599.
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search that may result in the minimising of human suffering and maximising
of social good. 10 4 But what is the social good in this question? It is suggested
that the social good - within this context - could be equated with an
economic policy that lessens the financial burden on citizens and supports
and maintains genetically defective citizens. The wisest policy is, by
consensus, that which promotes a good - social, economic or otherwise for the greatest number. Thus, human need and well-being shape the degree
10 5
of positive good resulting from one policy as opposed to another.
Alternatively, a determination could be made in order to structure what is
right or wrong, good or evil, according to whether the consequences of10 an
act
6
or public policy add to or detract from the aggregate human well being.
Ultimately, the decision for or against a policy is going to be tied to
development and maintenance of an a priori standard of ethics (where, in
theory, a balancing occurred before the standard was set) or to a situation
ethic by which the consequences, pro and con, equities or inequities, or each
proposed action will be carefully weighed and a conclusion with an ethical
posture or structure of a standard of modus operandi 10 7 will be reached.
2. EncouragingExperimentation
Recognising that a sustained level of progress for society would depend
upon a continuing standard of technological evolution as well as individual
technological contributions of exceptional merit and benefit, the Founding
Fathers endeavoured to codify this attitude within the United States
Constitution itself. By structuring a system of checks and balances within the
Constitution which would promote both perspectives, contributions which
were truly exceptional could be promoted by grant of a limited
monopolisation as authorised by the Patent Clause. 10 8 However, the grant of
limited monopolisation was intended to be consistent with the guarantees of
the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments, which recognise the right of all
citizens to develop their individual skills in pursuit of a trade or calling.' 0 9
The recorded history of efforts to legitimise monopolies for patents of
unworthy inventions is long. To its credit the United States Supreme Court
has thwarted these efforts and has thus recognised and enforced the

104 R.L. Sinsheimer, "Potential Risks" in National Academy of Sciences (ed.), Research with
Recombinant DNA (1977).
105 Goodfield, note 90 supra, 71.
106 Fletcher, note 97 supra, 1128-1139.
107 Id., 1138.
108 See generally, T. Beauchamp & L. Walters, Contemporary Issues in Bioethics (1978); Smith,
"Uncertainties on the Spiral Staircase" note 35 supra
109 See Irons & Sears, "Patent 'Re-examination': A Case for Administrative Arrogation" [1980] Utah
L Rev 287-288. By the Patent Clause, Congress is authorised "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ...
Discoveries". U.S. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 8.
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Constitutional mandate to allow the unfettered growth and natural evolution
of technology. 1 0

On June 16 1980, by a five to four vote, the United States Supreme Court
decided that new forms of laboratory life were eligible for patents. 1 ' The
decision may be regarded as a ratification of some of the accomplishments of
the "biological revolution" which has allowed a broader understanding of life
and promoted a greater ability to manipulate various forms. However, both
the majority opinion and the dissent stressed that they addressed only the

question of whether the current patent laws evinced a congressional intent to
deny patents to those inventions determined to be alive.112 More particularly,

the Court chose to tie itself to the United States Code section which provides:
[wlhoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."13

Out of this statute emerged the issue of whether a manufactured
microorganism constituted a "manufacture" or "composition of matter"
within the meaning of the statute. 114
Dr Ananda M. Chakrabarty, a micro-biologist employed by the General
Electric Corporation, engaged in research in which he succeeded in

manufacturing a new microorganism, not found in nature, which is effective
in breaking up oil spills. This genetically engineered strain of pseudomonas is

made by combining (or cross breeding) four strains of oil eating bacteria into
one man-made scavenging microorganism which combines the beneficial
properties of each of its four parent bacteria. Each of the four strains digests
particular hydrocarbons in a mixture of oil and water - such as is found in
petroleum spills. Useful by-products of water, carbon dioxide and a bacterial

protein nutritious to inhabitants of the ocean, remain. Dr Chakrabarty
demonstrated that this manufactured 'superstrain' is much more efficient in
digesting oil than a mixture of the four individual bacteria. Another
advantage is that this microorganism, if it 'escaped', would not be able to
thrive in gas tanks or in the oil fields of the earth and wreak uncontrolled

110 See Sakraida v. AgPro Inc 425 US 273, 279 (1976); Graham v. John Deere Co. 383 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1966); Atlantic Works v. Brady 107 US 192, 200 (1882). Interestingly, about 65-70% of litigated
patents are invalidated. Beauchamp & Walters, note 108 supra 305.
111

Note 82 supra.

112 Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, surveyed the Patent Act of 1793, as re-enacted in 1952, the Plant
Patent Act of 1920, and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 and concluded that there existed a
strong congressional limitation against patenting bacteria. "It is the role of Congress, not this Court,
to broaden or narrow the reach of the patent laws. This is especially true where, as here, the
composition sought to be patented uniquely implicates matters of public concern." Id., 322. For
those who have followed Justice Brennan's judicial philosophy, this position, which calls for judicial
restraint, is most interesting and unusual. In the past, he has been the judicial activist and Chief
Justice Burger the apostle ofjudicial restraint. In Chakrabarty, the roles were reversed.
113 35USC 101 (1976).

114 Note 82 supra, 307.
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environmental havoc on the ecosphere. 115 The Chakrabarty bacterium had
already been granted a patent in Britain, which had followed several
European nations in recognising both plants and animals as patentable. 16
The patent application of Chakrabarty and General Electric was for a
manufactured microorganism product not found in nature as well as a process
of using the microorganism, on a carrier, to digest oil spilled in water. The
United States Patent Office rejected the product claim, but allowed a portion
of the process claim. The rationale for rejection of the product claim was that
a living organism -

a naturally occurring product of nature - as this was

determined to be, was not within the classes of subject matter which are
patentable. The Patent Office reached this conclusion because there was no
mention of such a class in the controlling statute or in the statute's legislative
history. This decision was upheld by the Patent Office Board of Appeals, but
the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed, and the
Patent 1 and
Trademark Office appealed to the United States Supreme
7
Court. 1
In the past, the Patent Office has included living things within the statutory
subject matter. For example, in 1873, United States Patent No. 141,072 was
issued to Louis Pasteur. Claim two of the patent application reads: "[y] east,
free from organic germs of disease, as an article of manufacture". 18 There
are other examples,119in other patents, of claims having been granted for
viruses and cultures.
Today, there are more than one hundred patent applications related to
products of genetic engineering. 120 Chakrabarty sets the pace for a wide
variety of new man-made organisms which can facilitate socially desirable
processes such as growing wheat in arid lands, leeching ores to assist mining
companies in reaching remote parts of the earth, and producing a "bug" that
will ferment corn starch or corn syrup into ethanol, an alcohol used in both
whisky and gasohol. There is also a patent application for a bacterium that
metabolises ethylene into ethylene glycol (antifreeze) .121
As noted previously, the major thrust of the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Chakrabarty is tied to the interpretation of the term
"manufacture" as it appears in the Federal patent code. Observing that

115 Gore, "The Awesome Worlds Within a Cell" (1976) 150 Nat 7Geographic 355, 374-375.
116 See generally, Kiley, "Common Sense and the Uncommon Bacterium - Is 'Life' Patentable"
(1978) 60 J Pat Off Socy 468; Wegner, "The Patentability of 'New' Manufactures' - The Living
Invention" in BNA (ed.) Patent Law Conference Coursebook (1978).
117 Application of Chakrabarty, 517 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A.) dismissed 439 US 801 (1978) rev'd sub nom.
Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.), cert. granted, 444 US 924 (1979).
118 Student Papers, "Microbiological Plant Patents" (1966) 10 Idea 87.
119 Ibid See I.P. Cooper, "Patent Protection for New Forms of Life" (1979) 38 Fed BarJ 34; R.F. Kip,
"The Patentability of Natural Phenomena" (1952) 20 Geo Wash L Rev 371.
120 J.S. DeMott & E. Thomas, "Test-Tube Life: Regulating U.S. Pat. Off." Time Mag June 30 1980, 52.
121 See D. Nelkin, "Threats and Promises: Negotiating the Control of Research" (1978) 107 Daedalus

191.

UNS WLaw Journal

Volume 10

Thomas Jefferson's Patent Act of 1793 stressed its coverage to "any new and
useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or
useful improvement [thereof]," Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
majority, defined manufacture as 'the production of articles for use from
raw or prepared materials prepared by giving to these materials new forms,
qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand labor or by
machinery'". 122 Citing approving precedent defining "'composition of
matter' as including 'all compositions of two or more substances and ...
all
composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of
mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids"',
the Chief Justice concluded that the Chakrabarty microorganism qualified as
being within patentable subject matter. 123 The claim is particularly forceful
since it is for a product of human ingenuity which is non-natural in its
24
occurrence. 1
In response to the argument that microorganisms cannot be patentable
without express congressional authorisation, the Chief Justice declared that
Congress had already defined what was patentable subject matter in section
101 of the Act, and that it was for the courts to interpret that provision.
Finding no ambiguity in the statutory provisions and stressing the broad
constitutional and statutory goal of promoting "the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts", Chief Justice Burger adhered to his position that the
definition the Court gives to section 101 is consistent with the goals of the
Act. 125
The Court declined to acknowledge the "grave risks" or the "gruesome
parade of horribles" which the Patent Office argued that the Court should
weigh in deciding whether the Chakrabarty invention is patentable. 126
Although acknowledging that "genetic research and related technological
developments may spread pollution and disease, that it may result in a loss of
genetic diversity, and that its practice may tend to depreciate the value of
human life", 127 the Court concluded that neither the grant nor the denial of
patents on microorganisms will end advance in genetic research nor "deter
the scientific mind from probing into the unknown any more than Canute
could command the tides."' 28 The Court stated unequivocally that scientific
arguments against advancements in this field are matters of "high policy"
which should be considered by the legislative process which balances and
places in proper perspective the various competing values and interests of all

122 Note82 supra, 308.
123 Ibid.
124 Id., 310. See generally, Delgado & Miller, "God, Galileo and Government: Toward Constitutional
Protection for Scientific Inquiry" in G.P. Smith (ed.) 1 Ethical, Legal and Social Challenges to a Brave
New World (1982) 231.
125 Note82 supra, 315.
126 Id., 316-317.
127 Id., 316.
128 Id.,
317.
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interested parties. 129 The Chief Justice concluded by noting that if the Court
had misconstrued the provisions of section 101, all that Congress needed to
do was to amend the statute so as to exclude from the protection
of the patent
30
laws organisms which are produced by genetic engineering.1
Despite the Court's disclaimer that its action was purely constructive in
nature - merely an interpretation of a statutory mandate - it did attempt to
validate a new national policy. While invoking the Jeffersonian concept of
ingenuity in patent creativeness, it came down four-square on a policy of
encouraging experimentation into the "New Biology" despite the possible
risk to mankind. Thus, while disclaiming the application of a balancing test, it
- in effect - performed one. It correctly decided that the utility of the good

that will flow from research and experimentation into the varied fields of the
"New Biology" far outweighs the potential harm accruing as a consequence
of such an undertaking. This is an eminently fair and reasonable position.
3. A FurtherInnovative Application
In May 1987 the United States Patent and Trademark Office announced
that it 'considers non-naturally occurring nonhuman multi-cellular living
organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject matter"'. 3 1 Although
viewed by the Patent Office as but an effort to keep pace with the startling
new advances in biotechnology, and thereby encourage innovation and not
determine its ethical implications, others - such as animal rights advocates
- were concerned that animals were being considered as products and not
sentient beings.' 3 2 Some feared also that the new policy would enable a select
number of biotechnology companies to dominate the livestock industry thereby eliminating small independent breeders and seeking to eliminate
genetic diversity among farm animals,13 3 since with patents the34central issue
becomes who either owns or is in control of breeding livestock. 1
Theologians quarrelled with the Patent Office policy because it not only
equated heavenly made creatures with manufactured goods of the market
place, but took a giant step on the slippery slope that would lead to the
patenting of genetically altered human beings and man's full assumption of
God-like powers. The clear specification of the policy
that its application was
35
only for "nonhuman life" was of no assurance here. 1
Informed members of the scientific community saw the Patent Office as
merely continuing the reasonable exploitation of nature. As a director of
Ohio University's Animal Biotechnology Center in Athens, Ohio, said

129
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131
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Id., 311.
Time Mag May4 1987, 110.
Ibid.
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succinctly: .' [a] pig is a pig, and a cow is a cow. You merely enhance certain

aspects of it."'136
It is expected that the near future of biotechnology will give rise to work in
laboratories in the United States where virus and bacteria genes will be
transferred to plants in an effort to enable them to produce their own
particular insecticides or fertilisers. After field testing, these "transgenic"
plants will in turn be used by farmers in the place of conventional crop
varieties.1 37 Further successful research will be undertaken that manipulates
the primordial cells producing sperm and eggs to, in turn, enable breeders to
determine the sex and other preferred characteristics of their animals;
routine gene transplants from one species to another will be accomplished

routinely. 138
Already the Federal Department of Agriculture operating from its
Research Center in Beltsville, Maryland, has produced a brown rust-coloured
"transgenic" pig that was bred with the growth hormone of a cow.
Engineered with the idea of achieving less fat, the pig has met this scientific
purpose. But, sadly, it also suffers from severe arthritis and thus has difficulty
walking and has crossed eyes as well. 13 9 A policy group opposing genetic
engineering, the Foundation of Economic Trends, together with the Human
Society, unsuccessfully maintained a legal action against the efforts of the
government to halt the research that produced this particular boar's father.
The essence of their claim was that research of this nature not only was cruel
and violated animal dignities, but would also have very significant social and
economic repercussions in that more expensive animals
would in turn cause
40
severe market dislocations in the farm economy. 1
As discussed previously, 1 41 these and similar concerns over patenting life
were raised initially with the Chakrabarty decision. 1 42 Since no catastrophic
events have followed in the aftermath of Chakrabarty,and none are expected
from this new policy of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the
on-going debates over the long range effects of genetic engineering and its
ethical constraints will be of little value in halting the momentum of scientific
inquiry, experimentation and advancement of biotechnology.
As the director of The Hastings Center in New York - an organisation
devoted to the continuing ethical study of the effects of advances of the new
biological technologies on society - stated, "[iut's very hard to sustain a

136 Ibid. Because of the economic importance for Australia of the overseas export trade of animal
products, it is expected that Australia will follow the United States lead in patenting animal forms.
Current Topics, "The Patenting of Animal Forms with New Traits" (1987) 61 ALJ 324, 326.
137 K. Schneider, "A Patent on Life Forms Gets Genes Into Business" Int' Herald Tribune June 9
1987, 1, col. 7.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 See notes 85-107 supra
142 See P.M. Boffey, "Animal Rights, Fears of 'Human Husbandry' Complicate Debate on
Biotechnology" Int'l Herald Tribune June 10 1987, 6, col. 1.
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great deal of worry about these things, ... when, after 10 years of1 43pretty
constant interest and attention, there have been no untoward events."'
IV.

TOWARD A STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS

The Supreme Court's actions in Chakrabarty and the recent Patent and
Trademark policy on the patentability of nonhuman life, give private
corporations the incentive to invest in further research into the fields of
bio-chemistry, genetics and eugenics. This incentive and the anticipated
result therefrom satisfy the constitutional objective of early disclosure which
- in turn - expands the public domain of knowledge in these fields. There
can be little doubt that patentability of microorganisms and nonhuman life
forms is "Progress of the Useful Arts".
Man's dehumanisation and depersonalisation will not be fostered as a
consequence of the continued quest for mastery of the genetic code.
Attendant on the freedom to undertake research into the exciting and fertile
frontiers of the "New Biology" is a coexistent responsibility to pursue the
work in a reasonable, rational manner. Pursuing the "New Biology" in such a
manner requires adequate attention to the safety factor in all aspects of the
experimentation.14 4 The undesirable elements of a Brave New World can be
tempered only when knowledge is pursued with the purpose of establishing
the truth and integrity of the question, issue or process. 145 The vast potentials
for advancing society and ridding it of a verisimilitude of its present ills is an
obvious good which must be pursued steadily. Little sustaining harm can
result from a reasonable pursuit of truth and knowledge; for, indeed, truth
and knowledge are the basic interstices in any balancing test.' 46 If actions are
undertaken and performed with the goal of minimising human suffering and
maximising the social good, then the noble integrity of evolution and genetic
progress will be preserved.
There can be little quarrel with Stone's idea of social responsibility in
scientific inquiry and investigation. I find myself, however, in respectful
dissent from his concern regarding the dangers of research into the fields of
the non-coital reproductive sciences. Indeed, so long as procreation
continues to remain the central driving force in a marital relationship and the
family the very core of a progressive society, efforts will be undertaken to
expand the period of fecundity and combat infertility, itself. Genetic planning

143 Id., col. 7. See generally, "Comment, The Prospect of Private Unauthorized Eugenics and Ten Feet
Tall Basketball Players: A Case for Legislative Oversight?" (1985)1 J Contemp Health L & Policy 135.
144 R.L. Sinsheimer, "The Right to Free Inquiry" (1975) 190 Science 768.
145 See G.P. Smith, "Manipulating the Genetic Code: Jurisprudential Conundrums" (1976) 64 Ga L
Rev 697. See also Office of Technology Assessment, Impact of Applied Genetics (1981); Note,
"Building a Better Bacterium: Genetic Engineering and the Patent Law After Diamond v.
Chakrabar' (1981) 81 Colum L Rev 159.
146 Lederberg, "Orthobiosis: The Perfection of Man" in A. Tiselius & S. Nilsson (eds) Place of Value in
a WorldofFacts (1980) 29.
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and eugenic programming are more rational and humane alternatives to
population regulation through death by famine and war.
Man must endeavour, to be sure, to execute his investigatory and
manipulative or creative powers within the scientific laboratory with a
rational purpose and in a spirit of humanism. As thus, he should seek to
minimise human suffering thereby contributing to the social goal of allowing
all members of society an equal opportunity to achieve their maximum
output within the economic market place and to maintain personal integrity
and seek spiritual tranquility. Genetic engineering which contributes to the
social good should be utilised fully. There can be no real doubt that genetic
manipulation provides a perilous opportunity that may either threaten
freedom or enhance it - depending upon the balance
struck between its use
147
for individual need satisfaction and societal good.
Restraining scientific inquiry, then, to my way of analysis, should be
limited only to action taken to be unreasonable.Accordingly, an undertaking
would be regarded as unreasonable when the long and short term costs of its
effects would outweigh the enduring benefits that would derive from its
study and implementation. Viewed, then, as being not only an aid to the
tragedy of infertility in family planning, but as a tool for enhancing the health
of a nation's citizens, vital scientific research must continue in the new
reproductive technologies and in efforts to engineer man's genetic
weaknesses out of the line of inheritance. Healthier and genetically sound
individuals have a much better opportunity for pursuing and achieving the
"good life" and in turn making a significant contribution to society's greater
well being.148 This, then, is the province and function of law, science and
medicine.
The "judgment of justice" has yet to be given in charting the province and
function of law, science and medicine. 149 One matter is certain, however. The
leeways of choice and patterns of discourse are not as wide as might be
expected.15 0 For, when the simple goal of any scientific inquiry is the
minimisation of human suffering and the maximisation of the social good
deriving therefrom, it must be pursued in a reasonable manner.

147 See M.D. Kirby, "Bioethical Decisions and Opportunity Costs" 2 (1986) J Contemp Health L &
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Theory of Law" (1986) 9 UNSWLJ 26. This issue of the Journal is dedicated to Dr Stone's memory
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